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THE ROLE OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
IN WATER PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
MYRON B. FIERING*

In the decade of the 1960's systems analysis became a respected
scientific discipline, with departments at universities, sections in
libraries, and professional journals and societies bearing the phrase
"systems analysis" somewhere in their titles. Perhaps this empirical
evidence alone is enough to suggest that systems analysis has a fundamental role in water-resource planning and design. The point of
this essay is to argue that this is true if, and only if, a few new and
important conditions and concepts are introduced into what has now
become the standard litany of systems analysis. In other words,
despite the remarkable success and wide commercial appeal of systems analysis, and despite the concomitant evolution of its comradein-arms, the automatic computer, all is not well in the systemsanalytic world. It has become clear that systems techniques applied
to remarkably complex deterministic (or nearly so) systems such as
satellite navigation, automobile production, highway construction,
etc. can produce optimal results, but that optimality is an elusive
concept when applied to problems of conflict of interest, resource
allocation, human value judgments, and stochastic processes. In this
essay we exclude from consideration all those allocation, assignment,
decision-theoretic analyses for which conflict, and its resolution, are
not important.
This is to take an admittedly narrow view of systems analysis, but
to do otherwise would necessarily lead to a procession of success
stories in which the problem was "solved" by the application of one
or another optimization algorithm. And there are many such success
stories. One has only to open any prestigious current journal of
water-resources planning to find that most papers emphasize optimization of one decision variable or another, or perhaps some
parameter of a distribution or coefficient of a model. Optimization
seems almost to have become a new religion, with the applied
mathematician its high priest and the automatic computer its holy
scripture.
Consider some examples. Gaging networks have been optimized,
*Gordon McKay Professor of Engineering and Applied Mathematics, Harvard University,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
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but only recently has a test been developed to estimate the statistical
validity of transferring information among locations in the network;
to date there has been no published information on the economic
validity of this process, although some work is in progress. Optimal
schedules for capacity expansion of water supply and waste disposal
systems have been developed, with virtually no attention to the fact
that a large number of the better schedules might differ in cost by a
few percent but that they might differ widely with respect to their
political feasibility. In other words, over a wide range of decisions, it
might not much matter which decision is taken. This problem was
discussed at length by Harrington in a joint paper' which demonstrates some shortcomings of systems applications to water resources.
He showed that systems studies often are directed at the wrong
question, and cited as an example a published study in capacity
expansion, for which many near-optimal (but different) solutions
gave economic results within 3.3% of the global optimum, but were
vastly different with respect to their institutional feasibility. Harrington discussed a model with uncertainty in the objective function, for
which it turns out that the same solution is optimal over a wide range
of objectives but that the value of the functional varies sharply. In
other words, the solution does not change, but the outcome does;
that is contrasted to the first example, in which the solution may
change while the outcome remains virtually constant. In this first
case, because the outcome does not vary significantly, the planners
should have more latitude to negotiate with those impacted by the
decision, in order to identify that solution which is politically and
institutionally most feasible-this is because the system's economic
response is largely indifferent to that choice.
This is an important concept because it introduces the notion that
the several parties to a decision-those who have vested interests in
its outcome-typically perceive and measure outcomes along axes
which reflect their basic positions; these positions, often being
antithetical, lead to conflicts. Conservationists view the world differently than do industrial polluters. This is not to pass any value judgments, to condemn the polluters, to tolerate condescendingly the
conservationists, or whatever. It is to state the simple economic and
social fact of life that intelligent, honorable, decent people perceive
identical sets of consequences to have different benefits and costs.
The solution must accommodate the fact that a typical waterresource plan has an output vector, with many elements, rather than
a scalar. That would be troublesome enough. But it is complicated
1. P. Rogers, M. Fiering and J. Harrington, Standards, Optimality and Resilience in Water
Resource Planning,presented at ASCE Water Resources Conference, San Diego, April, 1976.

October 19761

ROLE OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

further by the fact that each party to the decision, representing a
different vested interest, has a different set of weights (articulated or
not) attached to the various elements, and that each party carries a
different weight or a different level of political clout into the
decision-making process.
Harrington showed how these and similar cases lead to generalizations concerning the robustness of system design. The term robustness is taken directly from the statistical literature, where the robustness of a decision, for example, to accept or reject a particular
hypothesis, is large if that decision would remain unchanged over a
wide range of sample values or evidence on which the decision is to
be based. The thrust of Harrington's argument is that it is inappropriate to argue overmuch about the relative economic advantages of
one solution or another if their relative values or differences are small
compared to the random errors attached to each value and if candidate solutions, all lying close to the optimum, have importantly
different levels of appeal to the parties.
Even laying aside the difficult problem of system sensitivity to
changes in objectives, it is instructive to consider the robustness of
the institutions which specify and delimit the problem, and which
thereby formulate the objectives and constraints on the model
adopted for systems analysis. Rogers,2 in the same joint paper cited
above, explored this notion with a linear programming model for
river basin planning. He assumed for purposes of comparison that an
existing planning analysis of water-resource allocation for the Aswan
Dam represents the "true" specification of the system in terms of the
number of variables and constraints in the linear program. In other
words, he assumed that the published solution contains precisely as
much technologic complexity as required, i.e., the number of constraints is in some sense correct, and that it correctly identifies all the
relevant control variables, i.e., the number of variables is in some
sense correct. He then examined the extent to which a solution
would deviate from the true optimal response due to faulty specification of the problem. Such mis-specification can take two forms:
either the number of variables is incorrect, typically too small, leading to a solution which is too small but which increases as the
number of variables approaches the true value, or the number of
constraints is incorrect, typically too small, leading to a solution
which is too large but which decreases as the number of constraints
increases toward its true value. Of course, both the number of variables and the number of constraints can be improperly specified.
The point of Rogers' arguments is to show the distribution of
2. Id.
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results associated with mis-specification and to draw conclusions concerning the necessity of having the correct mathematical programming models for water-resource planning. If it turns out that exact
specification is critical because errors due to mis-specification are
large, an investment in improved specification might be preferred to
one in improved data collection and manipulation.
On the other hand, if it can be shown that errors due to mis-specification are manageably small, a strong argument can be made for
reduction in the scale and hence the complexity of the model and,
perhaps, a re-allocation of resources which favor more thorough
examination of near-optimal, in the spirit of Harrington, above. The
advantage here is that this richer menu of alternatives is more likely
to produce candidate solutions which, while not optimal, are at least
acceptable to the adversary interests in the decision-making process.
Again, the concept of robustness is central. For Rogers, the issue is
the robustness of the mathematical programming algorithm itself.
This is distinct from Harrington's emphasis on the robustness of the
economic and physical systems.
Fiering, in the joint paper,3 and in collaboration with Matalas,4
introduced still another form of robustness into problems of waterresource design. Consider a river-basin plan involving a significant
number of reservoirs, say 8 or 10, in parallel, with their cumulative
output conveyed to meet the water supply requirements of a nearby
community. A common problem is to identify a small number of
combinations appropriate for detailed analysis; it is widely recognized that final analysis and design typically proceed by system
simulation or some other, equivalently expensive, technique. It therefore is useful and prudent systematically to evaluate by some
efficient but relatively imprecise algorithm a large number of potential reservoir combinations in the hope that a few will survive as
candidates for detailed analysis by more expensive procedures. Thus
the planning process typically includes preliminary screening,
through which a few combinations, perhaps 6 or so, emerge as
worthy of further consideration. Much has been written about techniques to define these candidate combinations, but little has been
noted about the consequences of choosing a set which does not
include the best choice, but then operating the system so as to simulate relatively closely the economic response characteristic of that
best choice.
3. Id.
4. N. Matalas and M. Fiering, Water Resource Systems Planning,NAS/NRC, Geophysical
Research Board, Panel on Climate Modification (in press).
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In other words, if the combined system is robust, there will be
many combinations, involving different numbers of reservoirs, which
might be operated' so as closely to approach the performance of the
true optimal combination. A trial analysis was made using data
derived from the Delaware River Basin planning model, which has
appeared often in the literature. It was noted that while a least-cost
solution, or combination, could be found to meet a given downstream target, a large number of different combinations could do so
nearly as cheaply. If the downstream target were small, then only
one or two upstream reservoirs were required; clearly the robustness
of the system is small because with only one or two reservoirs it is
difficult to take advantage of system redundancy in order to
approach the performance of an optimal combination. A symmetrical argument can be made for a large demand, for which virtually the entire reservoir array must be constructed. In the Delaware
example 8 reservoirs are available; there is only one combination of
8, and 8 combinations of 7, so that statistical results are suspect for
such small numbers. But there are SC4 or 70 combinations of 4
reservoirs, and in the Delaware example no single reservoir is particularly efficient relative to the others, so the problem is one of identifying combinations useful in that they can meet the total storage
need while not being significantly more expensive than their competitors.
For each level of investment, or for each increment in total system
size, ranging from 0 through 8, one can calculate the average cost of
each combination of n reservoirs designed and operated so as to meet
a particular target demand, T. The value is denoted C(n,T); let C*
(n,T) be the minimal cost of meeting the target T with n reservoirs.
The ratio C*/C is a measure of the robustness of the n-reservoir
system in meeting target T. It measures the cost-effectiveness of a
sample chosen at random from among all those which have n reservoirs; the effectiveness is relative to the cost of the least-cost solution. An analogous parameter can be defined for the capacity expansion model described by Harrington. A robustness parameter or
index can be used to characterize large systems in terms of their
operational, not structural, redundancy. It is important to note that
it is not a characteristic of physical performance alone; economic
considerations, i.e., systems cost, are involved in defining system
robustness.
The concept can be generalized so that it accords closely with the
traditional statistical notions of confidence and tolerance. Suppose a
hydrologic system can be completely specified by a single population
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parameter, say the mean flow p.. Suppose also that a relatively small
number of alternative designs are available; we identify these as
D1 ,D2 ,...,Dn. There is some range of the population flow t for which
D, is the optimal design. We identify this range by the symbol gi,
recognizing that this symbol is not the ith value of Mbut a shorthand
notation of all values of p which lie in the ith interval. The intervals
pi need not be equal, and if the mean flows are given as discrete
values, then the intervals have no width and the symbol pi becomes
the ith element in the list of n discrete mean flow values.
In any case, if the population mean p is known with certainty to
be gi, the associated optimal design is unambiguously known to be
Di. The difficulty comes from the fact that p is never known exactly;
the best we can do is calculate R, an estimate of p, and hope that the
estimate is good enough to make reliable choices among the available
design options. In this simplistic decision model, the design choice
depends only on the mean flow and not on higher moments or the
correlation structure of the inflows; this is done in the interest of
clarity, although generalization to additional hydrologic parameters
results merely in increased dimensionality of the decision process.
Let Ri be the range of sample means which could, at probability level
p, obtain from a population whose true mean is jAi . Clearly the range
pi will be included in xi, but Ri will also extend beyond the limits of
that range because of anticipated sampling error. The degree to
which Ri extends beyond pii is a function of the distribution of flows,
the length of record associated with measuring 4i, and the probability level p. In the simplest case, the relevant ranges of the population mean flow are t, and t2, for which D, and D2 , respectively, are
optimal design choices. At probability level p, R, is associated with
pI and therefore specifies selection of DI, and similarly for i 2 . But
because Xi overlaps or extends beyond the limits of pi, it follows
that R, intersects .2, whereupon there is no unambiguous design
choice Di throughout a portion of the range of R. This is shown in
Figure 1. It is important to note that the extent of this zone of
ambiguity is a function of p, which is analogous to, the confidence
interval in statistical hypothesis testing, and of the sample size, which
is a surrogate for the loss of information sustained in moving from
the population p to its sample estimate R. The robustness of design
Di can be measured by the ratio of that portion of the range xi over
which design Di is unambiguously preferred to the entire range Ri,
over which design Di might be optimal It is the conditional probability that design Di is correctly specified, given that it is specified
in the first place. We denote this probability pi(P), the argument
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being included to indicate the dependence of robustness on the
parameter p, which is associated with the loss of information on the
sampling process.
If prior or subjective probabilities ii can be assigned to the states
defined by pi, then the robustness of the system is given by
p(p)=

7ripi(p).

The symbol E is the traditional methematical representation for summation, and the entire expression represents a weighted average
taken over all options. This compact notation, used throughout statistics and mathematics, need not be understood by the mathematically unlettered reader; the main point is to note that a design or
planning process can, in part, be characterized by a weighted combination of the characteristics of the constituent alternatives.
The consequence associated with choosing Dj when Di is optimal
need not be catastrophic. The work of Rogers, Fiering and Harrington cited above shows this clearly to be the case. Suppose an erroneous design, through proper operation or good fortune associated
with an insensitive system, can be made to perform nearly as well as
the optimal design; let the net benefits be a factor a of the optimal
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benefits. In this example we take a to be a scalar whose value might
typically be a > 0.9 because we assume that system response is
measured by a scalar which we call "benefits." But in the general
case, where system output is a vector, the factor a would contain
several elements. A design Di is said to be resilient at levels (p,a) if
with probability p it yields outputs or responses at least as great as a
times that response which would have been available under conditions of perfect information. The interesting analogy is that resilience
incorporates an index of probability which measures the reliability of
the system for gathering information and an economic parameter
which measures the propensity of the decision-maker to tolerate
erroneous results. In this sense the parameters (p,a) are directly
analogous to the confidence and tolerance limits of statistical
hypothesis testing. If we denote the resilience of design Di as Ri(p,a),
it follows directly that the system resilience is
R =
nsriR(P,a).
The result of all this is the conclusion that the cult of optimization
is probably narrowly applicable in areas of water-resource management; planners should be more intensively concerned with negotiation among feasible and near-optimal alternatives, the institutional
strengths demonstrated by parties to the decision, the prospects for
side payments to make more palatable the prospect of compromise,
and system characteristics defined by the concept of robustness and
resilience. In bther words, one should seek a calculus of surprise
which guarantees, or lays heavy emphasis on, the prospect that a
solution will remain workable even though the hydrologic regime,
the economic objective, the cost and benefits, and the technological
responses are subject to unanticipated perturbation during the lifetime of the system.
At this point it should be clear that applications of systems
analysis to water-resource planning should stress the use of mathematical models to represent conflicts because well-defined objectives
and constraints can rarely be found. It is useful to consider how
water-resource projects come to be planned and how they lead to
conflicting interests and strategies. The proposal for a water resource
system frequently follows a major disaster-flood, drought, power
outage, etc. The long sweep of history, appropriate to some rational
decision-making concept such as expectation of net benefits, is generally precluded from the planning process because the recent past,
dominated by catastrophic events, is heavily weighted. 5
5. Some of this material is drawn in part from the author's essay Reservoir Planning and
Operation, in Stochastic Approaches to Water Resources, ch. 17 (H. Shen, ed.)
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The role of the media in extending coverage of disasters is extraordinary. In 1938, The New York Times carried headlines describing
the hurricane of that year as the most severe ever to strike the
northeast; yet a few days later, well-informed people from other
parts of the nation could hardly recall the event. But with instant,
live television coverage available today, such ignorance is inconceivable, and so would be any fiscal hard-heartedness applied to
disaster relief. The national inclination is to support reconstruction,
to forgive loans, and to prevent recurrence. Citizens committees,
planning boards, advisory groups and local hearings provide the
momentum for obtaining public support, governmental sanction, and
federal contributions for many such projects.
But at the same time that we generate national concern for the
unlucky victims of catastrophe, so does our current and legitimate
concern with environmental management encourage the critical
review and evaluation of every major water-resource proposal. It has
been estimated that the minimal time from proposal to completion
of a reservoir is of the order of 25 years!
Conflicting views cause the proponents of each side to seek interested members of Congress or federal agencies whose responsibility
runs to making preliminary investigations. Agencies which push for
project authorization are not necessarily evil or greedy, nor do they
seek merely to justify their own existence. Taking a position for or
against the construction of a project reflects the operation of our
autonomous, de-centralized federal system. It tends to expose the
decision-making process to scrutiny, attack, and generally to some
compromise. It is, or at least can be, sound, reliable and honest. It
leads to identification of that agency or authority which carries the
ultimate burden of decision-making. This is critical because the
objective function of that decision-maker becomes a dominant factor
in system planning. The literature contains many mathematical
models, optimization techniques, synthetic flow studies, computer
analyses, optimal plans and operating policies, or optimal anything;
this is the new religion. But generally overlooked is the fact that
these models cannot lead to meaningful solutions under our system
unless the individuals impacted by them can agree on an objective
and on a scheme for implementation. Under the traditional wisdom
it is convenient to posit that men of good will could agree on an
objective whose maximization (or minimization, or whatever) would
obviously be ". . . in everybody's best interest." This simple-minded
approach leads to emphasis on the technical issues, the optimization
whereby some function is pushed to its extreme, with little attention
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to a consideration of the political, social and economic choices subsumed by these objectives.
Legislative remedies have been tried. By establishing water quality
criteria, Congress has expressed the national view on expenditures for
a certain class of constraints. But who is to bear these costs? The
nation? State or regional authorities? Municipalities? These questions
deal with the establishment of incentive schemes, such as the provision under Public Law 92-500, which returns to municipalities 75%
of the capital cost of approved sewage treatment facilities. In this
case, it has been demonstrated 6 that the technological choices actually made by municipalities lead to a total (national) cost almost
twice as large as the least-cost technological options! The reason for
this, apart from tradition and identification of regional favorites, for
EPA authorities and consulting engineers, is that the federal government pays on the basis of capital rather than operating cost, leading
to capital-intensive programs which are less expensive to the individual communities but more expensive to the nation. The burden is
transferred from the property tax to the federal tax. Issues of equity
and redistribution of national income must be considered in a technological decision. Administrators and agencies, like private citizens,
have preferences and biases, and these are expressed through the
specification of objectives, policies and criteria. It is an inevitable
consequence of our political system, and leads to placement of the
project on the priority list of some agency.
At this stage of the planning it is necessary to articulate rules for
calculating benefits, costs and constraints. Parties to the decision
generally cannot agree on an objective function, nor can they define
a single rule for calculating and combining economic outcomes of
project operation. Not only do the parties differ in how the benefits
and costs for particular uses shall be calculated, but also in how they
should be combined after individual values are calculated.
Representatives of environmental interests presumably will insist,
at least as an opening gambit, on low levels and frequencies of allowable violations of water quality, recognizing that this opening position is modified to be consistent with the institution's bargaining
strength. In negotiations among some nations bargaining strength can
be represented by the threat of war, and can lead to results different
from those which might have been attained if the parties had agreed
to cooperate.
In the simplest or ideal case, if we add the discounted net benefits
6. Meta Systems, Inc., Report to the National Commission on Water Quality, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1975.

October 19761

ROLE OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

as perceived by the decision-maker, the objective function assigns a
uniform political emphasis or weighting factor to each of the participants. But if we examine the reality of the situation, note that we
build models which drive the design process; it should be quite the
other way around. Models are expensive, have high inertia and are
fun to run; we also tend to believe the results of computer-generated
output. This success tends to drive us to build even bigger models so
that some models drive or service other models. We need to know
something about synthetic hydrologic traces to service simulation
models, but in order to know that we need to know something about
the distribution of historical flows, and in order to learn that we have
to know something about regression estimates so that we can transfer
information from gage to ungaged sites, and in order to do that we
need to know something about hydrologic modeling. So we tend to
build models to serve models to serve models to serve models, and
with all the computation, accumulated truncation, roundoff error,
physical and intellectual slippage, there are important questions as to
the reliability of the results. Most decision-making models are geared
toward a monolithic decision-making enterprise, which we know
does not exist. Thus it seems clear that some systems analytic models
are pressed forward because they service the needs and interests of
of their promoters more than the needs of the problem.
Much of what has been written in this essay can be summarized by
a few important concepts. First is the. notion of conflict, in the
absence of which much more systems theory would be applicable to
water-resource planning. Objective functions would be easier to
determine, constraints would be defined on rational rather than
emotional bases, etc. Large mathematical programming models might
be appropriate, and generally speaking, negotiation frontiers,
dominated strategies, and all of the subtleties of coalition strategies
and political weighting factors which characterize Paretian Environmental Analysis, as described by Dorfman et al,1 would be unnecessary. We would still have somehow to deal with problems of
unanticipated physical or economic shifts, but there would be little
problem in evaluating any proposed scenario associated with such
shifts. However, this is all fantasy because in the real world, for
virtually every water-resource project of any importance, conflict is a
fact of life and cannot be avoided.
A second, related, notion is that of robustness. Given that conflict
exists, and given that a water-resource system is subject to unpre7. R. Dorfman, H. Jacoby and H. Thomas, Models for Regional Water Quality Management (1972).
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dictable perturbations in its performance, it is reasonable to seek
solutions which are non-optimal but significantly less brittle than the
optimum. Robustness can be measured with respect to a variety of
system parameters. One way to discriminate between robustness and
system sensitivity is to note that robustness is a total derivative while
sensitivity is a partial derivative. The total derivative, given its chain
form, takes account of changes which might be made in a variety of
system parameters to accommodate shifts in one or another performance characteristic. Sensitivity, defined as a partial derivative,
sets constant all other parameters. Thus even if system sensitivity is
high, robustness may be quite low with respect to a particular decision because changes in that decision might be balanced or accommodated by shifts in other, correlated variables. We have only
recently begun seriously to use this property of systems.
Third, we tend to think of stability as an important property of
resource systems. The consequence is that environmental standards
and policies often are directed at maintaining ecological stability
without regard to biological facts. It is traditional in engineering to
specify standards as static criteria which the system must meet with
some probability, typically close to unity. Arbitrary imposition of
this concept of stability might result in restraining a system which
ordinarily would drift within a domain of stability, and would
thereby impose a control cost which might better be invested elsewhere. Suppose the biology of the system dictates that within the
domain of stability, any point is approximately as "good" as any
other; economic resources directed at keeping the system in the
center of the domain of stability might be mis-allocated. Thus
stability is contrasted to the concept of resilience, which was introduced first by Holling8 and generalized in a water-resource context
by Fiering and Holling.9 The thrust of that work is somehow to
design for prospects which are not specified at the time of design,
and therefore to which no probability of occurrence can be assigned.
This is significantly different than specifying a possible system perturbation and recognizing that no probability assignment can be
made; in dealing with system relience, Holling specifies that the
system must be exposed to threats whose identity is not known, but
that the unthinkable will occur.
The conclusion from this essay is therefore that on all countspolitical, economic, statistical, algorithmic and environmental-we
8. Holling, Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems, Ann. Rev. of Ecology and

Systemics, 4 (1973).
9. Fiering & Holling, Management and Standards for Perturbed Ecosystems, 1 ArgoEcosystems 301 (1974).
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have come to a point in the sophistication of machinery and
mathematical modeling where it is tempting to build big models, run
elaborate optimization schemes, and devote enormous resources to
projects which have very long lead times and which might even be
irreversible, for example, a commitment to construct nuclear energy
facilities on a large scale. The traditional cut-and-try procedures of
engineering, which were significantly improved by the first generation of computers-but not displaced at that time, as they now have
been by the more elaborate and sophisticated modeling procedures
available on larger machines-provided systematic control to guard
against the possibility of egregious error. With increased reliance on
big models, and with increased complexity which places the internal
mechanism of such models well beyond the comprehension of the
average user, the burden of responsible use weighs heavily on the
engineering profession. By systematic consideration of some of the
issues and concepts raised in this essay, it is hoped that system techniques will not necessarily be taken at face value, widely believed,
and blindly and perhaps irrevocably applied.

